Taiwan’s Vice President Calls for Closer EU Ties

Overview

In Brussels today, Taiwan’s Vice President Bi‑khim Hsiao called on the European Union to deepen trade, technology and security ties with Taiwan. The speech—delivered to a gathering of international lawmakers—spotlights a broader realignment: the EU’s rapidly expanding engagement with first‑island‑chain partners (Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines). That alignment supports U.S. leadership by hardening deterrence, diversifying suppliers in chips and clean‑tech, and anchoring trusted data and defense links across the Indo‑Pacific.

What Happened

• Rare appeal in Brussels: Taiwan’s vice president urged the EU to strengthen trade, security and tech cooperation, arguing that peace in the Taiwan Strait underpins global economic stability. (AP report today)
• EU–Taiwan channel is real: The European Commission’s office in Taipei (since 2003) and a standing Trade & Investment Dialogue frame cooperation on semiconductors and supply‑chain security.
• Allied momentum: EU–Japan trade topped about €190 billion in 2024 under the EPA; Brussels and Tokyo also unveiled new defence and economic security initiatives in 2024–25. Manila and the EU launched new dialogues on cyber/hybrid threats and reported progress toward an FTA in 2025.

How Closer EU–First‑Island‑Chain Ties Reinforce U.S. Leadership

1. Deterrence-by‑denial around Taiwan: Deeper EU political and industrial alignment with Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines complements a U.S. forward‑denial strategy inside the First Island Chain and raises costs for coercion.
2. Tech & standards coalition: A stronger EU–Taiwan/Japan pipeline on chips, AI and information security tightens export‑control seams with the U.S., preserving America’s edge in advanced compute and trusted networks.
3. Industrial surge capacity: EU defence‑industrial links with Japan and growing EU‑Philippines security cooperation broaden the allied production base for munitions, maritime domain awareness and critical infrastructure protection.

Supply‑Chain Effects: Semiconductors, Clean‑Tech, and Logistics

• Chips: Taiwan remains the hub for leading‑edge logic and advanced packaging. EU–Taiwan dialogues on semiconductors and potential investment agreements, plus EU–Japan coordination, reduce single‑point‑of‑failure risk and create more “friend‑shored” redundancy for U.S. buyers.
• Numbers that matter: World Semiconductor Trade Statistics projects robust growth into 2025; the U.S. CHIPS Act has driven a surge in American fab construction; SIA’s 2025 report highlights the U.S. ecosystem’s breadth. Together with TSMC’s multi‑billion U.S. expansions, these trends knit trans‑Atlantic and Indo‑Pacific chip corridors.
• EU–ASEAN linkages: Services trade between the EU and ASEAN reached about €132 billion in 2023; ASEAN FDI hit a record $230 billion in 2023. As the Philippines advances an EU FTA, more production steps (electronics, EV components) can shift into allied networks that feed U.S. markets.

Implications for the U.S. Economy

• Manufacturing build‑out: U.S. chip‑related construction has “skyrocketed” post‑CHIPS, with data centers and fabs leading the 2025 outlook—an upswing reinforced when Europe and first‑island‑chain partners harmonize supply‑chain and security policies.
• Risk premiums & pricing: Diversifying through EU–Taiwan/Japan cooperation and an eventual EU–Philippines FTA lowers disruption risk in advanced electronics, tempering volatility in AI hardware costs and improving planning for U.S. hyperscalers and OEMs.
• Trade routes & maritime security: EU defence ties with Japan and growing security cooperation with the Philippines complement U.S. and Japanese patrols and trilateral drills, supporting safer sea lanes for LNG and container traffic.

Data & Signals

• EU–Japan trade in goods & services exceeded ~€190 billion in 2024 under the EPA; Brussels and Tokyo are extending cooperation into defence industry and information security.
• EU services trade with ASEAN reached ~€132 billion in 2023; ASEAN FDI inflows hit a record $230 billion in 2023.
• U.S. chip construction spending accelerated sharply after CHIPS; SIA’s 2025 report maps a broadening U.S. semiconductor ecosystem; TSMC continues major U.S. investments.

Outlook

Expect more EU parliamentary diplomacy with Taiwan, plus practical chip R&D and standards projects that link Brussels with Taipei and Tokyo. If Manila and the EU land a high‑standard FTA while Germany, France and others expand security cooperation with the Philippines, the First Island Chain becomes a denser allied network—supporting U.S. leadership and reducing global supply‑chain fragility.

Sources

• AP News — Taiwan’s vice president calls for closer EU ties (today).
• European Commission — EU trade relations with Taiwan (office in Taipei; dialogues).
• European Parliament Resolution — EU–Taiwan trade and investment relations (2023).
• EU–Japan trade facts & figures (Consilium, 2024/2025) and security/defence partnership papers.
• AP News — EU and Japan agree to work together on free trade & economic security (2025).
• EU–ASEAN trade in services (Consilium, 2023 data) & ASEAN Investment Report 2024 (FDI $230B, 2023).
• Philippines–EU FTA progress reports (2025 press coverage).
• USNI Proceedings — Forward denial inside the First Island Chain (2025) & Brookings on basing.
• PIIE — U.S. chip construction surge after CHIPS Act (2024) and SIA State of the Industry 2025.
• Reuters — Germany–Philippines defence agreement (2025); FT — TSMC U.S. investment updates.